


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**U.S. ARMY
PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
INTO THE YEAR 2000**

BY

MR. TERRY F. GREENE
Defense Intelligence Agency

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This paper looks at present day shortfalls in the national PSYOP organizational structure and in particular the U.S. Army. It attempts to look specifically at the organization of U.S. Army PSYOP under the existing CAPSTONE plan, which apportions PSYOP forces to maneuver units based on the cold-war strategic environment of the last 40 years. With downsizing being driven by budgetary constraints, new methods and organizations must be created to more effectively address the needs of the nation for PSYOP across the operational continuum. This requires a reorganization of U.S. Army PSYOP under a new provisional table of organization and equipment, with units regionally focused to perform their missions in any contingencies, versus permanent allocation to a CINC. A national-level organization for PSYOP must be established to insure PSYOP is an integral part of our national security policies and programs. Ad hoc committees created in reaction to regional crisis are not the answer. The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide PSYOP strategy is badly needed. This study examines historically, two recent conflicts (Vietnam, Desert Storm) where PSYOP played a major role, looks at the problems brought to light at their conclusions, and makes recommendations to improve U.S. PSYOP capabilities into the year 2000.

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U.S. ARMY PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS
INTO THE YEAR 2000

by

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Introduction

It is United States policy that psychological operations (PSYOP) will be conducted across the operational continuum. While PSYOP was widely used in Vietnam and military assets and skills involved were increased proportionately, when the conflict ended the services, and particularly the Army lost interest in the field, permitted their equipment to become obsolescent and allowed the establishment to dwindle to a shadow of its former self. Even with a resurgence of interest in PSYOP since 1979, the changes brought about in the Special Operations (SO) community with the Cohen-Nunn Amendment in 1986 creating Major Force Program 11, and the much heralded successes in Desert Shield/Desert Storm, PSYOP continues to be a Theater/Battlefield Operating System (T/BOS) that few commanders have a real understanding of, and more importantly, are able to employ efficiently as a force multiplier. Contributing directly to the ineffectiveness of PSYOP as a T/BOS in recent years is an organizational structure based on CAPSTONE alignments that are no longer adequate to meet the needs of present or future requirements. Of the four PSYOP Groups, eleven battalions, and twenty-six separate companies in the Army's inventory, only one group (4th PSYOP Group) headquarters and five battalions are in the active component (AC); the remainder are all reserve component (RC) units.

In 1980, the Army instituted the CAPSTONE program designed to more closely link peacetime planning and training of active and reserve component units to wartime needs in both the continental U.S. and overseas. Reserve component PSYOP units were among the first to be fully integrated into the program; and by the end of 1981 virtually every unit in the community had received a specific wartime mission and was actively planning for it.

The following discussion is intended to explore the problems associated with the CAPSTONE program, the utility of PSYOP in future military operations, specific roles and missions and organizations suitable to address those requirements.

This will be accomplished first by analyzing the present and future threat environment; chronicling two major conflicts where PSYOP proved its worth; reviewing DoD doctrine for employment, and lastly establishing current and future requirements into the year 2000.

PSYOP INTO THE YEAR 2000

According to JCS PUB 3-53, July 1992, PSYOP support joint and combined operations, interagency activities, conventional forces, or special operations. The role of PSYOP varies depending on the level of operational activity or environment. PSYOP is conducted across the operational continuum (Peacetime, Hostilities Short-of-War, War). It must be understood that PSYOP are conducted continuously to influence foreign behavior favorable to U.S. national security objectives. Any type or level of PSYOP can be conducted at any point along the operational continuum.

The operational continuum is defined by JCS Pub 3-0 as:

"The strategic environment within each theater consisting of a variety of conditions - political, economic, military - and a range of threats that result in a wide range of operations that can correspondingly occur in response to those conditions and threats consisting of three general states: peacetime, competition, conflict, and war."

What is the strategic environment U.S. forces are likely to have to face in the year 2000 and beyond? The demise of the Soviet Union as a major global threat, coupled with increased regional instability and conflict, provides a new dimension of challenge to the United States. While we no longer face the single defining threat which dominated our policy, budgets, force structures, and indeed our fears for forty years, multiple

threats to our security still remain. Today's challenges are more complex, ambiguous and diffuse than ever before. They are political, economic, and military; unilateral and multilateral; short-and long-term.

Militarily, global security is threatened by regional instabilities which we may have to confront either to protect our own citizens and interests or at the request of our allies or the United Nations. The end of the Cold War has coincided with a virtual explosion of long-dormant ethnic and aggressive nationalistic tensions around the world, many of which have degenerated into international crisis. We are threatened by the continued proliferation of advanced conventional arms, ballistic missiles of increasing range, and weapons of mass destruction; by terrorism; and by the international drug trade.¹

As this paper looks to specific roles for U.S. Army PSYOP, it is imperative that it reflect changes that benefit from lessons learned from successful, and some not so successful, U.S. PSYOP programs of the past.

VIETNAM:

While PSYOP was widely used in Vietnam a number of factors undercut the U.S. effort. The 4th POG was the principal unit coordinating Army tactical PSYOP. However, all U.S. PSYOP fell under the control of the Joint U.S. Public Affairs Office (JUSPAO), headed by the chief of the United States Information

Agency-Vietnam. JUSPAO employed 250 Americans and 600 Vietnamese in its various divisions. At its peak, the total U.S. personnel commitment to PSYOP in Vietnam was 1,200 Americans and 750 Vietnamese.

A number of factors contributed to the U.S. inability to employ PSYOP as effectively as it might have in Vietnam. To begin with, the American response to revolutionary warfare took place within the context of our traditional or conventional approach to war. The emphasis was not placed on the political and psychological dimensions of this form of conflict, but on firepower and technology. If the social and political aspects of revolutionary warfare are deemphasized, then the contribution of PSYOP is likewise downgraded.

PSYOP in Vietnam was an ancillary element of policy and strategy, and as the U.S. military effort grew, psychological operations became even less attractive to military personnel. Some commanders showed a distinct lack of appreciation for the role and capability of psychological operations, while a few held the propaganda tool in too high esteem and often were disappointed when their efforts did not produce immediate results. On the other hand, many were more interested in high body counts than defeating the enemy. The U.S. Army reported that, "The body count and kill attitudes was manifested in the remark of a unit commander who boasted that his Chieu Hoi program consisted of two 105mm howitzers -- one of which was marked 'Chieu' and the other 'Hoi.'"² The commander, in his disdain,

made reference to the Chieu Hoi or "Open Arms" program, which was an American inspired and funded amnesty program, based on forgiveness and exoneration for enemy soldiers willing to defect or surrender.

Other significant PSYOP themes used during the war included: the fear appeal, which was used to convince the individual soldier or civilian that he faced an overwhelming danger of being killed if he remained with the Communists; a second major appeal was developed when it came to light that many quit the enemy ranks because of the severe hardships they suffered in the jungles. Thus, the Chieu Hoi program was developed to allow enemy soldiers "an escape" from the severities of their lives. Additional appeals dealing with Chieu Hoi and surrender inducements were based on the loss of faith in Communist victory experienced by several among the enemy ranks. The fourth major appeal, concern for family, was one of the most emotionally charged and effective propaganda approaches used -- "Your family needs you now and is waiting for you. You must live and not die senselessly." Finally, the disillusionment appeal was based on the premise that the individual soldier might be able to withstand the fears and hardships of the struggle as long as he was convinced of the justness of Hanoi's aims, but when he became skeptical of these goals, he would be more prone to defect or surrender. This approach in many ways became the psychological coup de grace of American propaganda.

The government of Vietnam's less than stellar effort in establishing and maintaining a viable political community made the mission of U.S. PSYOP that much more difficult, in that it was not far reaching enough to create the sense of purpose for the successful defense against the communist enemy. The government of Vietnam's performance remained the achilles heel of the allied effort ... progress in building a viable political community was painfully slow, and it was not sufficient to defeat communism. This poor performance had a debilitating effect on the overall PSYOP effort. Propaganda and political action supports and promotes an indigenous government's reform and development efforts; it cannot serve as a substitute for these efforts.³

Additionally, the U.S. sought to substitute its own psychological operations for that of its Vietnamese ally. The U.S. began to communicate with the Vietnamese people in the name of their government. For example, the primary aim of America's first leaflet campaign, dubbed "Frantic Goat North," was to drive as broad a wedge as possible between the North Vietnamese people and the ruling Lao Dong Party. U.S. leaflets purported to come from the Saigon government, placed responsibility for the bombing of the North on the Ho Chi Minh regime. In effect the U.S. tried to do the job for the Vietnamese government. In doing so the U.S. had to substitute other channels for the face-to-face approach the enemy relied on. While important, mass media could not shoulder the communications burden alone. Instead, face-to-

face oral discussion between government representatives and the peasants in their villages was needed more than any other medium to establish and reinforce Saigon's ties with the countryside. As a result, the U.S. depended on leaflets and various other publications as well as radio and television broadcasts. For example, in 1967 the U.S. dropped five billion leaflets in Vietnam. In 1969 the distribution of magazines, newspapers, posters, and pamphlets totaled 24 million copies. A four-station radio network was created with coverage of 95 percent of the population around the clock. Likewise, a four-transmitter television network was established with six hours of daily programming at its peak. While these media efforts can complement oral communications by the host government with its populace, they cannot substitute for it.

The conditions noted above are indicative of the some of the major underlying problems effecting the PSYOP programs in Vietnam, but could be summed up in the absence of "unity of effort."

In spite of some lower-level coordination, the Americans and South Vietnamese conducted their own private communications programs with only minimal and superficial integration and cooperation. This occurred despite a U.S. doctrine calling for the joint efforts with allies during war and behind-the-scenes advisory role in counterinsurgency. Moreover, the U.S. Army had outlined the advisory nature of counterinsurgency PSYOP in May 1965, two months before the formation of JUSPAO:

Unlike other forms of warfare the normal function of the U.S. Army PSYOP resources is to advise and assist the host country armed forces PSYOP effort, rather than conduct PSYOP. Counterinsurgency PSYOP, if it is to be effective, must be conducted by indigenous personnel and wholly attributed to the host government.⁴

A consistent and well-orchestrated American-Vietnamese campaign could have resulted from close coordination. But cooperation proved to be difficult, if not impossible, during most of the war.

Finally, America lacked a U.S. national-level organization for PSYOP, and its effort in-country was fragmented. Unfortunately, there was no U.S. Army PSYOP commander, and JUSPAO was unrepresented at the command level. Consequently, allied PSYOP suffered from a lack of coordination and duplication of effort. U.S. PSYOP were conducted by no less than 10 organizations: JUSPAO, the U.S. Embassy Mission PSYOP Committee, Military Assistance Command-Vietnam, Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support, U.S. Army-Vietnam, 4th and 7th PSYOP Groups, force commanders and senior advisors, U.S. Naval Forces-Vietnam, and the 7th U.S. Army Force. This was in addition to the PSYOP of Vietnam and that of America's allies. In-country fragmentation only deepened the problems resulting from the lack of emphasis on PSYOP within overall U.S. strategy.⁵

DESERT SHIELD/DESERT STORM:

The mission of the 4th Psychological Operations Group (POG) and the 8th Psychological Operations Task Force (POTF), composed of the 8th PSYOP BN and elements of the 4th POG's PSYOP Dissemination BN, as directed by the U.S. Central Command was to: demonstrate U.S. resolve and improve the image of U.S. forces in-theater; support the defense of Saudi Arabia; and support offensive, consolidation, and enemy-prisoner-of-war operations throughout Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Iraq.

The 4th POG and the 8th POTF accomplished all three missions through various media, all of which involved establishing direct communication with enemy or civilian elements through the use of printed materials, radio and television broadcast, and loudspeaker operations.

PSYOP Campaign Themes For Desert Storm

- * Gain acceptance and support for U.S. operation.
- * Encourage Iraqi disaffection, alienation, defection and loss of confidence.
- * Create doubt in Iraqi leadership.
- * Encourage non-cooperation and resistance.
- * Strengthen confidence and determination of friendly states to resist aggression.
- * Improve deterrent value of U.S. forces.⁶

Campaign themes were focused on breaking the Iraqi will to resist, increasing the fears of Iraqi soldiers, and surrender, while pointing out that the Coalition was not opposed to the Iraqi people, but only to Iraq's national policy. The initial campaign themes were directed by the U.S. National Command Authority (NCA), passed to the Joint PSYOP Task Force (JPOTF), CINCCENT staff for development for operations. Prior to the start of hostilities, themes were subject to a "Panel-of-Experts" review (composed of Kuwaiti, Saudi, British, U.S. and Egyptian representatives) at the JPOTF, and Saudi government approval. During Desert Storm Saudi approval was not required.⁷

Initial planning was directed toward easily coordinated (allied aircraft and artillery units) and obtainable PSYOP dissemination methods. Such methods include airborne distribution of leaflets by C-130 aircraft or broadcast of selected news and information items by EC-130 Volant Solo aircraft. These efforts formed the nucleus of an operation that eventually distributed more than 29 million leaflets.

Operations also included an almost continuous broadcast of a daily two-hour radio program and the regionwide broadcast of a multi-national-power videotape designed to demonstrate U.S. resolve and encourage support for the coalition efforts in the region. The operation also supported tactical ground commanders through the forward deployment of 66 loudspeaker teams using man-pack or vehicle-and helicopter-mounted systems. These teams persuaded or instructed thousands of Iraqi soldiers to surrender.


Leaflets were used to support both combat and deception operations across the entire theater and had a significant impact in degrading enemy morale and will to fight. Post-testing on Iraqi Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW's) found that 98 percent of the test group was exposed to leaflet products, 80 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 70 percent were influenced by the leaflets to defect or surrender.⁸ Surrendering and defecting soldiers invariably had leaflets (figures 1-3) in their possession at the time they gave themselves up to U.S. and coalition forces, despite standing Iraqi army orders that anyone caught with leaflets would be killed.

One of the best known and successful PSYOP leaflet campaigns is described in the recently published book, *From Shield to Storm*, by James F. Dunnigan and Austin Bay.


"... U.S. Army psyops specialists prepared and distributed by airdrop a leaflet with a picture of a B-52. The leaflet gave, in Arabic, the date and time the next wave of B-52's would visit the Iraqi troops in the target zone. The B-52's arrived as prophesied. Suddenly, the psyops leaflets had a newfound credibility and encouraged many Iraqis to surrender before and after, the ground offensive began."

The 4th POG's "Voice of the Gulf" (VOG), radio broadcast carried war news programming, Arabic music, regular surrender messages, promises of food and water, assurances of good

FIGURES 1-3



ABOVE: "WARNING!
This location will be
shelled. Leave your
equipment and save
yourselves.
WARNING!"



ABOVE: "This is your first and last warning!
Tomorrow, the 16th Infantry Division will
be bombarded!! Flee from this location now!"



ABOVE: "This location is subject to bombardment.
Escape now and save yourselves."

treatment and an emphasis on the theme of Arab brotherhood was extremely effective. Iraqi prisoners considered VOG nearly as credible as the British Broadcasting Corporation and more credible than their own government's radio broadcasts. The threat to Iraqi troop morale from VOG was considered so serious that many Iraqi commanders outlawed the possession of transistor radios for their soldiers.

VOG was broadcast from fixed stations on the ground in Saudi Arabia and Turkey, and from Volant Solo aircraft.

Tactical loudspeaker teams from active and reserve components were assigned throughout the combat force structure. Designed to support specific corps- and division-level tactical operations, loudspeaker operations focused on communicating with the enemy and reinforcing leaflet and broadcast messages of futility and surrender. Loudspeaker teams were credited with large numbers of Iraqi surrenders, including entire battalions at one time, in addition to their roles in conducting deception operations and later in consolidation operations following the end of hostilities. The 4th POG, during post-testing, reported 34 percent of prisoners interviewed had been exposed to loudspeaker operations, 18 percent believed the PSYOP message, and 16 percent stated that loudspeaker operations induced surrender or defection.⁹

U.S. Army PSYOP in Desert Shield/Storm was exploited for the first time as a fully capable Theater and Battlefield Operating System, and as a war-fighting function that can remove troops and

units from the enemy's order of battle as effectively as bullets and bombs.

Based on the lessons of the past, the threat environment, and the present administration, what are the likely roles of the U.S. Army PSYOP forces into the year 2000?

Current U.S. Army PSYOP forces are organized, trained, and equipped to support the theater CINC's conventional forces at the strategic, operational and tactical levels, and to support other special operations forces and missions across the operational continuum.

According to U.S. Army PSYOP Doctrine (FM 100-25, FM 33-1) its primary role is to support of other military units or U.S. Government agencies in reaching U.S. national objectives. Their responsibilities are to --

- * Assess the psychological impact of military operations.
- * Advise the military commander or Department of Defense representatives on psychological action programs.
- * Develop and conduct PSYOP programs supporting military operations.
- * Counter hostile propaganda.

Specific mission requirements include the planning, conduct, and support of three interrelated PSYOP missions:

Strategic PSYOP which supports all three level of war and is important in all aspects of Peacetime, Hostilities Short-of-War, and War. At the strategic level, PSYOP take advantage of opportunities to influence governments, military forces, and civilian populations to advance long-term objectives. The National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff directs strategic PSYOP. The CINC in theater supports strategic PSYOP by encouraging foreign leaders to support positions favorable to the national aims of the U.S. and its allies.

Operational PSYOP (including Enemy Prisoner of War {EPW}, Counterintelligence {CI}, and consolidation operations) support mid-term objectives aimed at making the enemy and its supporting populace believe it cannot win and that it should withdraw from the theater of conflict. The operational level of PSYOP is the connecting link between strategy and tactics. It deals with the planning and conducting of campaigns and major operations in the theater of conflict. Commanders and their staffs normally plan and conduct these conducts.

Tactical PSYOP are planned and conducted to achieve immediate and short-term objectives. This support includes the employment of visual, audio, and audiovisual techniques in direct support of tactical units. At this level, PSYOP are designed to influence hostile civilian and enemy military personnel within the tactical commanders area of interest.¹⁰

FORCE APPLICATION MISSIONS

Having reviewed national PSYOP policy, responsibilities, and categories of missions, it is important to understand the types of operations U.S. Army PSYOP will likely be called upon to undertake given the threat environment, future political climates, and the new administration's national military strategy. While President Clinton and his cabinet have not, as yet, published their version of the strategy, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin published a white paper in February 1992,

" An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For the Post-Soviet Era," in which he notes situations or purposes for which he feels Americans might want military forces in the 1990's. They are:

- * Countering Regional Aggressors
 - Middle East/Southwest Asia
 - North Korea
 - Elsewhere
- * Combatting the Spread of Nuclear and other Mass Terror Weapons
- * Fighting Terrorism
- * Restricting Drug Trafficking
- * Keeping the Peace
- * Assisting Civilians

While the paper goes on to offer a different analytic approach to sizing the force for the future (vs Base Force) it is

important to note that the situations that he believes are likely to require the use of the military in the future are not significantly different from those of former Secretary Cheney's.

PSYOP in support of operations other than war (OTW) and/or Overt Peacetime PSYOP (OP3) will dominate future roles and missions into the year 2000 while maintaining its warfighting capabilities for contingency operations.

What are these OP3/OTW missions and what are the PSYOP objectives associated with these missions? The following PSYOP mission categories are not all inclusive but represent those areas of concentration likely to require the majority of operational commitment by U.S. Army PSYOP forces in years to come.

1. Peacetime Contingency Operations occur in crisis avoidance or crisis management situations requiring the use of military force to enhance or support diplomatic initiatives. Contingencies focus on specific problems usually requiring rapid, decisive solutions." U.S. Army doctrine on operations OTW states that peacetime contingency operations include, but are not limited to, the following activities:

- Disaster relief
- Shows of force and demonstrations
- Noncombatant evacuation operations
- Rescue and recovery operations
- Strikes and raids
- Peacemaking

- Unconventional warfare
- Security assistance surges
- Support to U.S. civil authorities¹²

The "Joint Low-Intensity Conflict (JLIC) Project Final Report" published in 1986 states that peacetime contingency operations are frequently psychological operations in themselves, since they are undertaken specifically to affect the attitudes and behavior of a foreign audience in advancement of U.S. national interests.¹³

Specific U.S. Army PSYOP responsibilities in Peacetime contingency operations may include:

- * Explaining the purpose of the U.S. contingency action to counter disinformation.
- * Assisting in establishing control of noncombatants, neutral, and other groups in the area of operations to help minimize casualties and to prevent interference with friendly operations.
- * Preventing or deterring interference by hostile forces or other nations in the contingency operation.
- * Providing continuing analyses of political and cultural factors to help minimize political and psychological effects of the operations.
- * Minimizing interference of indigenous populations.
- * Exploiting the withdrawal of U.S. forces while creating positive perceptions of U.S. intent and goodwill.

2. Combatting terrorism consists of actions taken to counter the terrorist threat. The lack of a psychological strategy in combatting terrorism has limited the role of PSYOP in this important mission category of OTW in the past. Since terrorism is a form of PSYOP, it is critical to integrate the psychological element of national power with the political, military, and economic elements in supporting a national strategy to combat terrorism. Future terrorism counteraction PSYOP missions will include:

- * Countering the adverse effects of a terrorist act.
- * Informing the target audience of terrorists' goals, leadership, and infrastructure.
- * Providing incentives to local populace to inform on terrorist groups.
- * Developing programs targeted at terrorist groups to persuade them that they cannot achieve their aims through terrorist activities, that they are at great personal risk, and that responsible governments will not negotiate with terrorists.

3. Counterdrug PSYOP missions will include: Loudspeaker, leaflet, radio, and television assets employed in support of DoD, Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and other interagency groups in the interdiction of drug activities of drug activities across U.S borders, as well as assistance to foreign governments in military

assistance packages aimed at production eradication. Additionally, the continuation of counterdrug assistance in the such areas as producing public awareness products, magazines, pamphlets, or videos like those produced by USSOCOM/USIA, "Americas War on Drugs", and "Negative Consequences of Narcotics Industry" may show long term results in the drug war. Moreover, professional training films/videos for counterdrug military/police forces can contribute to both the drug war by improving the effectiveness of the forces while promoting American ideals of human rights and due process of law.

4. Peacekeeping PSYOP missions: FM-100-20 discusses peacekeeping operations (PKO) as "military operations conducted with the consent of the belligerent parties to a conflict, to maintain a negotiated truce and to facilitate a diplomatic resolution."¹⁴ U.S. PKO's may range from providing a few observers to supervising a UN cease-fire and disengagement agreement, to managing a multinational-sponsored peacekeeping force interposed between two parties to a conflict. These operations will normally take place following diplomatic negotiations concerning the mandate, duration of stay, size, and type of forces that each participating nation will contribute in accordance with agreements between belligerent parties. PSYOP which has often been neglected in the past will play an important role in facilitating cooperation between the belligerent and

their supporters on the one hand and the PKO forces on the other hand by:

- * Keeping peace through persuasion rather than intimidation, i.e., radio and television broadcast as information programs to ensure the PKO objectives and efforts are fully understood and supported by the belligerent and their civilian populations.

- * Amplifying any U.S. humanitarian assistance and civic action program provided to win the favor of the populace and belligerent.

- * Helping promote acceptance of a cease-fire, withdrawal of troops, and compliance with security agreements by influencing belligerent' attitudes, emotions, opinions, and behavior. Such efforts can help to counter rumors and disinformation, and may even resolve some problems between the belligerent parties while they search for a long-term solution to their conflict.

- * Prior to the PKO deployment, PSYOP personnel can provide training support to sensitize troops to the importance of impartiality and objectivity in their mission, and to familiarize the troops with the dynamics of the political situation in the operating area, local culture, mores, religions, and taboos.

- * More importantly, in the operational and strategic sense, PSYOP can help project to regional actors and the world community a favorable image of an impartial and capable U.S. military force.¹⁵

5. PSYOP Support to Special Operations Forces. As noted at the start of this paper, SOF may support conventional military operations but were principally established and maintained by the U.S. after identifying a requirement to be able to implement a range of specialized military and paramilitary policy options without being forced to resort to the use of conventional units. In the context that Former Secretary Cheney describes the roles of SOF, it is axiomatic that some degree of policy emphasis on SOF will continue in U.S. defense strategy. To those ends PSYOP will play a direct or supporting role in SO stated under Public law (10 USC 167):

- * Direct Action (DA).
- * Special Reconnaissance (SR).
- * Unconventional Warfare (UW).
- * Foreign Internal Defense (FID).
- * Counterterrorism (CT).
- * Internal Defense (IDAD).
- * Non-combatant Evacuation Operations (NEO).

ORGANIZATION, STRUCTURE, AND CAPABILITIES FOR THE FUTURE

U.S. defense strategy is focused on smaller yet rapidly deployable active forces augmented as needed by capable reserve units. Experience during operations JUST CAUSE and DESERT SHIELD/STORM demonstrated that CINC's are not inclined to request the early activation of RC PSYOP units allocated to support them

per the CAPSTONE plan. Due in large part to their lack of appreciation for PSYOP as a combat multiplier, in particular its strategic and operational value prior to hostilities. A CINC without an effective PSYOP staff planning officer, is more likely to give priority to reserve combat or combat support units. The current organization of the 4th POG is designed to accomplish multi-purpose PSYOP on a conventional battlefield. RC units are assigned specific wartime missions, primarily in support of U.S. military commanders in war. Without congressional mobilization legislation to activate RC resources to support each contingency, the 4th POG, in addition to its wartime requirements, is obligated to continue to perform its peacetime missions while preparing to conduct PSYOP in contingency operations across the conflict spectrum. Requirements for the unit far exceed capabilities.

A new concept pending final Army approval would reorganize and integrate active and reserve component PSYOP forces. The new organization was developed by the 4th POG to deal with flaws in the L-series table of organization and equipment (LTOE) and the concept of employment alluded to in the previous paragraph. Specifically, The LTOE's capstone affiliation of PSYOP units to combat maneuver units, versus a regional orientation, creates problems when the maneuver unit is assigned to operate in a region outside that of the PSYOP unit's cultural and language orientation. Under the Capstone plan units plan, train, exercise and develop necessary language, cultural, and analytical skills

based on their affiliation to maneuver units in particular regions of the world, per the Unified Command Plan. For example, a reserve battalion and its subordinate units may be assigned to support a Corps in EUCOM. That PSYOP battalion's readiness would be focused around the development of linguists with specific European language skills as well as research analysts with expertise and indepth knowledge of the cultures in the regions. Should that Corps be deployed outside their normal theater of operation in a contingency, such as Desert Storm, the PSYOP battalion trained and prepared for a EUCOM scenario could not deploy to support it without major augmentation.

On 20 May 1991, a provisional table of organization and equipment (PTOE) was approved reconfiguring PSYOP into a force structure to best meet mission requirements of the future. RC PSYOP will no longer be aligned by C3 relationships with maneuver units, instead, RC PSYOP forces will be apportioned to regions, effectively ending PSYOP Capstone affiliations.¹⁶

Following Desert Shield/Storm representatives from the 4th POG, the Army Civil Affairs and PSYOP Command and the JFK Special Warfare Center and School formed a working group with a mission to expand the configuration to RC PSYOP forces, dubbed Total PSYOP Integration (TPI). Issues examined included the focus of PSYOP force, force structure and operational doctrine concerning AC/RC PSYOP integration during both peace and war. Under the new TPI concept the world is divided into thirds -- a Western region, encompassing U.S. Atlantic Command and U.S. Southern Command; a

Pacific region, including both U.S. Pacific Command and U.S. Central Command; and an Atlantic region, covering U.S. European Command (Europe to the Urals and Africa). This division takes into account the cultural and regional expertise required of PSYOP units to support these areas (See Appendix).¹⁷

Under the PTOE and the proposals of the TPI, approval and coordination of PSYOP campaigns will be accomplished at the theater-CINC level to ensure that U.S. national objectives are met and to eliminate the potential for contradictory information being produced by PSYOP and other information programs. Differing significantly from the LTOE structure which was based on the concept of a fully capable PSYOP unit assigned at the division level of military operations. Under this concept, the division commander approved all PSYOP in his area of influence.

The TPI team proposed a force structure that could be task-organized to meet any contingency requirement while maintaining realistic functional and regional orientations.

Under the TPI concept there will be only two reserve group headquarters which will have a functional orientation, with emphasis on command and control of subordinate battalions and preparation for their wartime missions.

Subordinate to the tactical PSYOP group are three tactical PSYOP battalions consisting of five tactical PSYOP companies each. The tactical group also is assigned a PSYOP dissemination battalion, designed along the lines of its active-component

counterpart, and a battalion whose sole mission is to provide PSYOP support for EPW operations.

The regional PSYOP group consists of three regionally oriented PSYOP battalions consisting of two regionally oriented propaganda development companies and one research-and-analysis company. Finally, the regional group is assigned a small strategic dissemination company.¹⁸

Regarding changes in employment concepts to accompany the proposed changes in force structure, the USSOCOM Joint Mission Analysis has identified the requirement for U.S. PSYOP forces to be able to engage two regional contingencies and simultaneously support other theaters. U.S. Army PSYOP forces can only meet the requirement through total force integration of AC and RC forces and accompanying congressional legislation that includes less restrictive mobilization requirements and/or provisions for longer annual training (AT) tours (ie. USSOCOM has proposed an expanded 30 day limit on annual training vice the present 18 days) this would allow RC units to conduct real world OP3 missions while on AT. The TPI working group designed an employment concept which incorporates the PSYOP force structure and the national security strategy. The concept calls for the engagement of AC PSYOP forces augmented by selected RC PSYOP forces during OP3 or OTW operations. Upon deployment of a large portion the AC force to a major regional contingency, the RC Regional Support Group would activate as required and deploy to the theater, assume AC peacetime mission responsibilities, and/or

engage a second major regional contingency with selected AC augmentation or RC Tactical Support elements.¹⁹ Based on the PTOE structure RC units regionally organized along the same lines as the 4th POG, would have the flexibility and the capability to support a gambit of contingencies in a given region per their allocation to the CINC. In other words, the PTOE allows PSYOP forces to be tasked organized to meet the contingency requirements with the appropriate personnel and equipment not possible under Capstone or the LTOE.

CONCLUSIONS

With U.S. national security strategy now focusing on regional vs global conflict, the concept for allocating PSYOP forces to a commander-in-chief (CINC) per the CAPSTONE plan needs revision. Additionally, the structure of active and reserve PSYOP forces must be reorganized to effectively employ the forces in the future when national budgetary policies and force reductions will continue to limit the size of the Active component. While Capstone was one of the real success stories in the improvement of the U.S. PSYOP capability, paradoxically, the program underscored one of the PSYOP community's glaring weaknesses: its limited capability to respond to OP3 or operations OTW. The provisional TOE which structures both AC and RC PSYOP forces to respond most effectively to regional

contingencies as well as OP3, improves PSYOP capabilities across the operational continuum.

Secondly, there is no U.S. national-level organization for PSYOP to ensure psychological operations is an integral part of our national security policies and programs. Ad hoc committees created in reaction to regional crises are not the answer. The continuity of a standing interagency board or committee to provide the necessary coordinating mechanism for development of a coherent, worldwide PSYOP strategy is badly needed. Because strategic-level PSYOP plans must be coordinated with other agencies and frequently require the use of their assets, the lack of an interagency coordinating mechanism results in inefficient, time-consuming, and incomplete coordination of theater PSYOP requirements and plans.²⁰ Thus, the conditions that lead to a three-month delay in the PSYOP plan approval for Desert Storm, with the approval coming just three days short of the start of the Air war.

Finally, in the next conflict, we may not have the preparation time to develop PSYOP plans as we did during Desert Shield. PSYOP efforts are fragmented and too frequently ineffectual, largely because PSYOP expertise is isolated from those who require it and from the mechanisms required to apply it effectively to every level of command. It is essential that full-time PSYOP staff planning officers be placed in every G-3 division and corps staff. The G-3 is responsible for integrating PSYOP and combat operations. This should encourage commanders


and staff officers to integrate PSYOP as a weapons system in their planning rather than treat it as an afterthought, as has been the case so often.

APPENDIX

PSYOP FORCE APPORTIONMENT AC AND RC PROPOSED

TYPE UNIT	PAC CENTCOM/ PACOM	WHEN LANTCOM/ SOUTHCOM	LANT EUCOM A/E	FUNCTIONAL
POG	0	0	0	0 (1)
RSG	0	0	0	1
TSG	0	0	0	1
RSB	1 (1)	1 (1)	1 (1)	0
TSB	1	1	1	0 (1)
POB (EPW)	0	0	0	1
PDB	0	0	0	1 (1)
RSC	2 (2)	2 (2)	2 (2)	0
RAC	1	1	1	0
TSC	5	5	5	0 (2)
POC (EPW)	0	0	0	2

PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS FORCE APPORTIONMENT




PTOE
PERCENT APPORTIONED
AC AND RC


PROPOSED STRUCTURE

ACTIVE


RESERVE




AC PSYOP FORCE



RC TACTICAL SUPPORT GROUP



RC REGIONAL SUPPORT GROUP




RC REGIONAL PSYOP UNIT LOCATIONS PROPOSED

WORLDWIDE

PACIFIC

WESTERN HEMISPHERE

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO PRESS



RC TACTICAL PSYOP UNIT LOCATIONS PROPOSED

WORLDWIDE

PACIFIC

~~WESTERN HEMISPHERE~~

~~ATLANTIC~~

13 POB (EPW)

19 POC (EPW)/13 POB (EPW)

39 POC (EPW)/13 POB (EPW)

93 PDB/2 TSG

2 TSG

14 TSB/2 TSG

361 TSC/14 TSB

20 TSC/14 TSB


4 TSC/14 TSB

24 TSC/14 TSB

362 TSC/14 TSB

16 TSB/2 TSG
5 TSC/16 TSB
21 TSC/15 TSB
350 TSC/15 TSB
246 TSC/15 TSB
16 TSC/15 TSB

305 TSB/2 TSG
351 TSC/305 TSB
10 TSC/305 TSB
308 TSC/305 TSB
245 TSC/305 TSB
244 TSC/305 TSB



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